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Abstract 
 
The current literature is silent on whether democracies are more fragile or less susceptible to 
economic and political breakdowns.  Using a host of political instability and policy instability 
variables, this paper explores empirically, whether political freedom (a proxy for democracy) has 
any effect on the stability of the political order.  Furthermore, it also explores the possibility that 
political freedom explains differences in the stability of economic policies. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
ost of the regime shifts in democracies occur through the electoral defeat of the incumbents, 
while dictatorships relinquish power only through violence.  Democracy requires consent of the 
citizenry, and consent requires political legitimacy.  Therefore, violent popular opposition is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a democratic breakdown.  Thus, it seems that to the extent that 
democratic authority is rooted in the popular consent, political violence poses less of a threat to them than it does to 
dictatorships.  However, recent experiences in Africa and Latin America indicate that democratic decay and political 
delegitimization coupled with disastrous economic performance shortened the lifespan of many democratic regimes.  
It is therefore not clear whether democracies are more or less resilient than dictatorships.   Nevertheless, it is 
possible that democratic regimes are characterized by more stable economic policies than non-democratic regimes 
and therefore the type of the political regime may be important, not for just being democratic or dictatorial but for 
the stability of its policies. 
 
By focusing on poor indicators of instability such as coups, revolutions and political assassinations, the 
current literature has failed to differentiate between the collapse of democratic and authoritarian rules or whether 
democratic regimes collapse for the same reasons as do authoritarian regimes. The current literature is silent on 
whether democracies are more fragile or less susceptible to economic and political breakdowns.  Using a host of 
political instability and policy instability variables, this paper explores empirically, whether political freedom (a 
proxy for democracy) has any effect on the stability of the political order.  Furthermore, it also explores the 
possibility that political freedom explains differences in the stability of economic policies.   The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows.  Section Two is an alternative view on the relative stability of democracies and dictatorships.   
Section Three is an empirical examination of the effect of political freedom on the stability of political regimes and 
also its effect on the stability of the underlying economic policies.  Section Four concludes and provides suggestions 
for future research.     
 
II. Alternative Views on Democracy and Stability 
 
Some studies suggest that democracies are more stable than dictatorships.  Resler and Kent (1993) suggest 
that democracies build their legitimacy on institutionalized procedures and constitutional guarantees of political 
rights and freedoms, while the primary means through which dictatorships establish their legitimacy is good 
economic performance.  Hence, economic setbacks are more likely to create instability in dictatorships than in 
democracies.  
 
Sorensen (1991) suggests that political democracy facilitate the translation of economic power into political 
power.  Dictatorships on the other hand threaten powerful interest groups and therefore undermining their 
sustainability.  The mutual accommodation of economic and political interests of the powerful makes democracies 
less destabilizing.  Przeworski (1991) also claimed that democracy allows political players to adopt, alter strategies, 
and build new alliances to advance their interests in the future.  It gives them opportunities to achieve their goals 
M 
International Business & Economics Research Journal  Volume 3, Number 10 
 40 
through institutionalized competition within the existing political framework without creating political upheavals.  
Dictatorships on the other hand dampen these opportunities and political actors resort to violence to change policies 
or to assume leadership. 
 
Democratic governments have a better mechanism for handling the transitions from one leader to another 
than authoritarian regimes, and elections are a practical and often peaceful ways for choosing between rival political 
leaders.  Therefore, democratic regimes allow for a variety of leaders with different kinds of skills to come to power. 
If one fails, it is possible to replace him with someone else with very different qualities.  Clague et. al. (1996) 
indicated that the turnover in democratic leaders is not a sign of political instability but a reflection of an effective 
judiciary that denies those who are defeated in elections to unilaterally extend their hold on power, making the 
underlying institutional framework stable and durable.   
 
Hirschman (1972) suggested that freedom of speech in democracies allows political leaders early warnings 
to serious troubles and when and how their policies run into trouble.  Sen (1984) has also argued that, precisely 
because they give citizens a means to express themselves, no democratic regimes have suffered from the kinds of 
massive famines that have afflicted authoritarian regimes.
1
   
 
Democratic regimes are also more likely to be freer and thus more dynamic economically than autocracies. 
Economic growth allows governments to meet the demands of citizens without raising taxes.  Democratic regimes 
are therefore more likely to be better than authoritarian regimes at developing policies that are effective and, as a 
result, satisfy the desires of the people.  A more satisfied people are less likely to be attracted to revolutionary ideas, 
which allows democratic regimes to be particularly stable.  Karen Remmer (1996) in a study of regime durability in 
Latin America found that the average durability of political democracies in Latin America since 1945 was 11.9 
years, as compared to an average of 6.8 years for dictatorships. 
 
In his seminal article on the social prerequisites of democracy, Lipset (1959) proffered the hypothesis that 
economic development precedes the development of economic freedom and democratic political institutions.  He 
argued that broadly based economic development is conducive to a democracy, because it usually leads to 
urbanization and unionization where educational levels rise and the middle class expands to the point where the 
division between the wealthy oligarchy and the impoverished masses is broken down.  Lipset (1959, pp. 31) pointed 
out: “Democracy is related to the state of economic development.  The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the 
chances that it will sustain democracy.”   
 
Lipset suggested that the sustainability of political freedom and democracy builds on the concept of 
economic effectiveness.  According to Lipset (1959, p. 91), “Prolonged effectiveness which lasts over a number of 
generations may give legitimacy to a political system; in the modern world, such effectiveness mainly means 
constant economic development."  More recently, Przeworski (1991) argued that freedom can not be sustained 
without economic development.  Przeworski (1991, p. 32) commented “To evoke compliance and participation, 
democracy must generate substantive outcomes: It must offer all the relevant political forces real opportunities to 
improve their material welfare.”  Therefore, the arguments of Lipset and Przeworski suggest that economic 
development fosters democracy, which then in turn promote stability. 
 
Contrary to the commonly held view that democracies are more stable than dictatorships, some studies 
suggest that dictatorships are more successful at economic management and are therefore less threatened by 
performance failure (Diamond 1988).  If regime durability varies with economic performance, and dictatorships are 
more able to channel resources to accumulation and the creation of wealth rather than consumption, democratic 
regimes are more vulnerable to economic performance setbacks and political turmoil than their authoritarian 
counterparts.   
 
 Ali and Crain (2002) suggest societies that have adopted infrastructures that favor production over 
diversion have typically done so through strong effective governments.  Democracies are more susceptible to 
                                                 
1 The deadly famine in Ethiopia in the early 80s lead to massive unrest and the eventual collapse of the communist government of Mengistu Haile 
Miriam.       
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political pressure groups and therefore tend to divert resources to their political power bases.  Voter preferences for 
current consumption over long term investment make democracies ill equipped to undertake the kind of policies 
necessary for sustained economic growth.  Bardhan (1993), Przeworski and Limongi (1993) and Weede suggest that 
development-minded authoritarian regimes are characterized by a high degree of insulation from short-term, pork-
barrel politics.  They also report that the ability to insulate institutions from redistributive politics allowed East-
Asian non-democratic, resource-poor countries to grow faster than comparable democratic countries.  Hence, if 
political stability is a function of economic development, dictatorship should last longer than comparable 
democracies.  
 
III. The Empirical Results 
 
i) Democracy and Political Stability 
 
Table 1 displays the regression results of the effect of political freedom, a proxy for democracy, on political 
instability.  The political instability variables are from the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 
Bank's Cross Polity Time-Series Data, and Levine and Easterly (1997).
2
  Most of the data is from 1960-1990.  See 
Appendix I for a detailed description of these variables.  The data of the other explanatory variables are from the 
World Development Indicators (2000), International Monetary Fund's (IMF) International Financial Statistics and 
the IMF's Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. The data covers the period 1975-2000 and over 119 countries.
3
  
A political regime dataset by Gasiorowski (1996) gives dates of transition among democratic, semi-democratic, 
authoritarian, and transitional regimes in the 97 largest third world countries from independence to 1992.  While 
very useful, this data set has two limitations.  First, it only includes regimes in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.  
And second, it defines a change in regime as a change from one type of regime to another.  That is, the Gasiorowski 
coding doesn’t show a shift from one form of authoritarianism to another, but only changes among the four 
possibilities of democratic, semi-democratic, authoritarian, and transitional regimes.  Thus, Ethiopia was coded 
authoritarian from 1871-present.  This political regime dataset, then, is satisfactory if we adopt the first approach to 
understanding stability and define stability as the duration of a particular kind of regime.  By itself, however, this 
dataset will not allow us to define stability as the duration of a particular regime. 
 
The dependent variables are different measures of political instability.  The independent variable of interest 
is Gastil’s political freedom index.  The index is from Freedom House and measures the level of political freedom.  
It ranks countries on a scale of 0-7, the higher the score, the lower the level of political freedom and civil liberty.  
The scale is reversed and the original ranking of 0-7 is converted into a scale of 0-1.  Since there is no reliable data 
on the democratic nature of different countries, political freedom is used as a proxy for democracy.  Because 
heteroskedasticity could be important across countries, the standard errors are based on White's (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix.   
 
Column 1 of Table 1 includes two control variables used as standard in the literature and political freedom 
as an additional explanatory variable.  The two control variables are GDP level, and the enrollment in secondary 
schools as a proxy for human capital.  It is possible that democracy or political freedom itself is a function of the 
level of development (GDP).  Therefore, the presence of multicollinearity among the explanatory variable (political 
freedom) and the other two control variables (GDP and LSEC75) are tested. A novel approach of testing 
multicollinearity is to use “Variance inflationary Factor or VIF.”  For example VIFj= 1/(1-Rj
2
) whereby Rj
2
 is the 
coefficient of determination of regression Xj on all other explanatory variables.  If  VIFj > 5,  Xj is highly correlated 
with other explanatory variables.
4
  All the VIFs were less than 3.  Since none of the VIFs exceeded 5, we proceeded 
using the ordinary least-squares regressions.  
 
The dependent variable in column 1 is a political instability index (antigovernment demonstrations).  The 
findings in column 1 suggest that political freedom is negatively correlated with antigovernment demonstrations; 
however, the effect of political freedom on antigovernment demonstrations is not significant at the conventional 
                                                 
2 Using data from Jodice and Taylor (1983), and Barro and Wolf (1989) did not significantly change the results. 
3 Because of missing data in some countries, the reported results are based on a sub-sample of the 119 countries.  
4 For a detailed description of VIF, see Marquqardt (1980). 
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level.  The effect of the level of economic development (GDP) on this political instability index appears to be weak 
with a very small coefficient. The other control variable (LSEC75) is also not significant.       
 
Column 2 uses the political instability measure (Assassinations) as the dependent variable.  The control 
variable (GDP) is significant and of the expected sign.  LSEC75 remains negative and statistically insignificant. The 
effect of the variable of interest (political freedom) on political assassinations is negative and significant.  Column 3 
includes a measure of cabinet change as the dependent variable.  The coefficient of the control variable (GDP) is 
negative and significant while the other control variable (LSEC75) is negative and insignificant.  The variable of 
interest (political freedom) is negative and insignificant.  Columns 4 and 5 report the regression results for measures 
of genocidal incidents and constitutional change as dependent variables.  The effect of the control variable (GDP) on 
genocidal incidents is negative and insignificant while its effect on constitutional change is negative and significant.  
LSEC75 has no effect on either of these variables.  The effect of political freedom on genocidal incidents is negative 
and significant while its effect on constitutional change is negative and insignificant.  Columns 6 and 7 use measures 
of government crisis and purges as the dependent variable.  The control variable (GDP) is negative and significant in 
the government crisis equation.  It is negative and insignificant in the purges equation.  The other control variable 
(LSEC75) remains negative and insignificant.  The variable of interest (political freedom) is negative and significant 
in both equations.   
 
Columns 8 and 9 use riots and revolutions as dependent variables.  The coefficient of GDP is negative and 
significant in both equations while the coefficients of LSEC75 and the variable of interest (political freedom) are 
negative and insignificant in both equations.  Columns 10 and 11 report the regression results when political 
instability measures (border wars and civil wars) are included in the regression equation as the dependent variables.  
The coefficient of GDP is negative and insignificant in the border war equation and negative and marginally 
significant in the civil war equation.  The coefficient of LSEC75 is negative and insignificant in both equations.  
Political freedom is negative and insignificant in the border war equation but negative and significant in the civil 
war equation.  The last regression in column 12 reports the result when coup d’etat is the dependent variable.  In this 
equation the coefficients of both GDP and the variable of interest (political freedom) are modestly significant.  The 
coefficient of human capital (LSEC75) is once more negative and insignificant.     
 
Column 13 shows the regression results when the political instability indices are aggregated into a 
composite index (AVG.INDEX) and used as the dependent variable.  The index is the weighted average of all the 
political instability indices.  The principal component analysis is used to determine the linear combination-the 
weights-of these variables that maximize the variation of the constructed components.  Principal component analysis 
involves a mathematical procedure that transforms a number of (possibly) correlated variables into a (smaller) 
number of uncorrelated variables called principal components. The first principal component accounts for as much 
of the variability in the data as possible, and each succeeding component accounts for as much of the remaining 
variability as possible.  This is an objective method of combining a set of variables into a single variable that best 
reflects the original data.  The coefficient of political freedom is negative and insignificant.  The coefficient of the 
control variable (GDP) is negative and significant while that of LSEC75 is negative and insignificant.     
 
To summarize the results of Table 1; the effect of political freedom (a proxy for democracy) on political 
instability is inconclusive.  Political freedom has no effect on six out of twelve commonly used proxies of political 
instability when two other control variables are also included in the model.  It has a negative and significant effect 
on another five of these instability measures while it has a modest and negative effect on the remaining variable. 
Political freedom has also no effect on the aggregated index when the political instability indices are aggregated into 
a composite index of political instability.  While the relationship between political freedom and political instability 
is clearly negative, the relationship is not solidly conclusive.  The results clearly indicate that political freedom is not 
a significant differentiating factor of why some regimes are characterized by a political turmoil while others are 
stable.  Hence, political freedom failed to explain differences in political instability across countries. Although 
political freedom may not have a direct effect on political instability it might contribute to the overall level stability 
of a country by fostering stable economic policies, an issue that will be addressed for the remainder of this section. 
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ii) Democracy and Policy Instability 
 
It is possible that the effect of democracy (or political freedom) on the level of political instability is 
indirect.  One possible channel through which political freedom translates into a stable political environment is its 
effect on economic policies.  We might be able to better understand political stability in terms of the stability of 
economic policy regimes, and this, in turn, can be affected by the nature of the political regime (democracy vs. 
autocracy or in this case higher level of political freedom vs. lower levels of political freedom).  In other words, 
political stability can itself be a function of the stability of economic policies which is also a function of democratic 
political institutions.   
 
Following the procedure used by Aizenman and Marion (1991) the unexpected effect of an economic 
policy can be calculated by fitting a first-order autoregressive process of the form: 
 
(Policy)t = 0 + 1 (Policy)  t-1 + ,  
 
where B1 is the autoregressive parameter.  The standard deviation of the residual term () is the unexpected part of 
the economic policy.  This policy instability variable is then used as the dependent variable.
5
  The variable of 
interest (political freedom) and the other two control variables will again be used as the right hand explanatory 
variables.   
 
 Policy Uncertainty = (0)+ (1)(GDP) + (2) LSEC75 + (3) Political Freedom 
 
Table 2 reports the empirical results of the relationship between political freedom and the policy instability 
variables.  Political freedom is significantly and negatively correlated with almost all of the policy uncertainty 
variables when controlled for the other relevant exogenous variables.  Column 1 of Table 2 contains the control 
variables of Table 1 and political freedom as the explanatory variable of interest.  The standard deviation of the 
residual (here on as SDR) of domestic credit as a measure of monetary policy uncertainty is used as the dependent 
variable.  The coefficient of political freedom is negative and significant.  Similarly in column 2, the effect of 
political freedom on the SDR of public debt (SDRDEBT) which measures the instability associated with changes in 
public debt is negative and significant.  Column 3 has SDRDEFICIT as the dependent variable as a measure of the 
instability associated with the frequent changes of the overall budget deficit.  Again, the effect of political freedom 
on this variable is negative and significant.  
 
Column 4 shows the effect of political freedom on a fiscal uncertainty variable (SDRGOV); the 
consumption of central government as a percent of GDP.  The coefficient of political freedom in this equation is 
significant and of the expected negative sign.  Columns 5 and 6 include trade policy variables (SDREXPORT and 
SDRIMPORT) as the dependent variables.  These two variables are measures of the instability related to changes in 
imports and exports as a percent of GDP.  The coefficient of political freedom is negative and significant in both 
equations.  The correlation between monetary policy surprises (SDRINTEREST, SDRINFLATION and 
SDRMONEY) and political freedom are shown in columns 7, 8, and 9.  Once more, the coefficient of political 
freedom is negative and significant in the SDRINTEREST and SDRINFLATION equations.  The correlation 
between money growth surprises (SDRMONEY) and political freedom is negative and significant at the 10 percent 
level.   
 
Column 10 adds fiscal policy instability variable (SDRTAXES) into the regression equation as the 
dependent variable, while column 11 includes trade policy instability variable (SDRTRADE) into the same 
regression equation as the dependent variable.  The coefficient of political freedom is negative and significant at the 
5 percent level in the fiscal policy equation while it is negative and significant at the 10 percent level in the trade 
policy equation.  Column 12 uses the trade policy instability variable SDRXRATE as the dependent variable.  Yet 
again, the effect of political freedom on exchange rate surprises is negative and significant.   
 
                                                 
5 See Appendix II for a description of the economic policy variables. 
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The statistical results in Table 2 indicate that there is significant relationship between political freedom and 
policy instability.  The results in Table 2 suggest that higher levels of political freedom foster higher levels of stable 
economic policies. The coefficient of political freedom designated as the variable of interest is negative and 
significant in almost all the regression equations in Table 2.  This tells a different story than the results in Table 1 
where the coefficient of political freedom was negative and significant in less than fifty percent of the regression 
equations.  Hence, the nature of the political regime is important not in terms of the durability of the regime per se 
but in terms of its effect on the stability of economic policies.  As shown by the results in Table 2, countries with 
high levels of political freedom tend to be exemplified also by stable and durable economic policies.     
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This paper used political freedom as a proxy for democracy and tested the effect of political freedom on the 
stability of political regimes as well as the stability of underlying economic policies.  The political freedom variable 
failed to capture the instability of constantly changing regimes.  The coefficient of political freedom was negative 
and significant in less than half of the regression equations when most of the widely used measures of political 
instability such as coups, revolutions, etc. are used as dependent variables.  The paper also presented the empirical 
results of the relationship between political freedom and several policy instability variables using appropriate and 
novel econometric techniques.  The results show that political freedom has a more dramatic and significant effect on 
the stability of economic policies.  The coefficient of political freedom is negative and significant in almost all the 
regression variables when a host of policy instability variables are used as dependent variables.   A further 
comprehensive research is needed on the multi-layered and the complex relationship among democracy, the 
durability and the stability of economic policies, and the resilience of the political order.   The central issue to be 
elaborated in future research is to explain the sources of policy instability.  Rapidly changing economic policies 
could, for example, be a proxy for an unstable political system.  Addressing these complex relationships is a major 
challenge, at least empirically, and hopefully future researchers would be able to separately evaluate the intricate 
relationship among the types of political regimes, the stability of these regimes, and their time-varying economic 
policies.    
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Table 1: The Effect of Political Freedom on Political Instability Dependent Variable: Political Instability (1960-1990) 
 ANTIGOV 
DEMONS 
(1) 
ASSASSINA- 
TIONS 
(2) 
CABINET 
CHANGE 
(3) 
GENOCIDE 
 
(4) 
CONSTIT 
CHANGE 
(5) 
GOV’T 
CRISIS 
(6) 
PURGES 
 
(7) 
RIOTS 
 
(8) 
REVOLU- 
TIONS 
(9) 
WAR 
 
(10) 
CIVIL 
WAR 
(11) 
COUPS 
 
(12) 
AVG. 
INDEX 
(13) 
GDP 
 
-7.1E-7 
(-2.207) 
-1.2E-6 
(-1.83) 
-8.9E-7 
(-2.26) 
-6.8E-7 
(-1.20) 
-9.5E-7 
(-2.82) 
-9.9E-7 
(-3.29) 
-7.2E-7 
(-1.21) 
-9.5E-7 
(-2.62 
-6.7E-7 
(-1.99) 
-5.9E-7 
(-0.17) 
-2.4E-6 
(-166) 
-2.5E-6 
(1.69) 
-1..343 
(-2.39) 
Lsec75 -0.0022 
(-0.231) 
-0.0025 
(-0.259) 
-0.0022 
(-0.23) 
-0.002 
(-0.19) 
-0.0007 
(-0.07) 
-0.0021 
(-0.22) 
-0.0017 
(-0.18) 
-0.002 
(-0.19) 
-0.0014 
(-0.14) 
-0.0011 
(-0.11) 
-0.0014 
(-0.15) 
-0.0025 
(-0.27) 
-0.003 
(-1.05) 
Political 
Freedom 
-0.001 
(-1.52) 
-26.389 
(-1.94) 
-0.0039 
(-0.60) 
-0.0741 
(-2.05) 
-0.0132 
(-0.91) 
-0.0126 
(-2.54) 
-0.0005 
(-3.11) 
-0.002 
(-0.23) 
0.0001 
(0.060) 
0.0068 
(0.788) 
-0.013 
(-2.33) 
-0.0166 
(-1.64) 
-0.004 
(-1.14) 
C 0.2263 
(7.19) 
0.2270 
(7.25) 
0.2282 
(7.175) 
0.236 
(7.43) 
0.2304 
(7.24) 
0.2264 
(7.19) 
0.2254 
(7.11) 
0.227 
(7.03) 
0.225 
(7.15) 
0.225 
(7.18) 
0.2441 
(7.13) 
0.2404 
(7.44) 
0.213 
(6.39) 
              
OBS. 90 90 90 89 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 89 
Method Of 
Estimation 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
ADJ. R2 0.005 0.113 0.007 0.094 0.1124 0.106 0.1029 0.083 0.0028 0.0100 0.1233 0.0335 0.1417 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  
Antigovdemons: is Anti-government demonstrations; Assassinations: is political assassinations; Cabinet Changes: Major cabinet changes; 
Genocide: Genocidal incidents; Const. Change: Major constitutional change; Coups: Coup d’etat; Gov’t Crisis: Major government crisis; 
Purges: Systematic elimination of political opposition; Revolutions: Illegal change of the elite; Riots: Violent demonstrations; War: Border 
wars 
 
Table 2: The Relationship Between Political Freedom and Policy Instability Dependent Variable: Policy Instability 
 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  
SDRDCREDIT: Standard deviation of the residual (SDR) of domestic credit; SDRDEBT: SDR of public and publicly guaranteed debt; 
SDRDEFICIT: SDR of Overall budget  
deficit; SDREXPORT: SDR of export of goods and services; SDRGOV: SDR of government expenditure as a percent of GDP; SDRIMPORT: 
SDR of import  
of goods and services; SDRINTEREST: SDR of deposit interest rate; SDRINFLATION: SDR of GDP deflator;  SDRMONEY: SDR of money 
and quasi-money;  
SDRTAXES: SDR of tax revenues; SDRXRATE: SDR of exchange rate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INDEP. 
VARIABLES 
SDR 
DCREDIT 
1 
SDR 
DEBT 
2 
SDR 
DEFICI
T 
3 
SDR 
GOV 
4 
SDR 
EXPORT 
5 
SDR 
IMPORT 
6 
SDR 
INTEREST 
7 
SDR 
INFLATION 
8 
SDR 
MONEY 
9 
SDR 
TAXES 
10 
SDR 
TRADE 
11 
SDR 
XRATE 
12 
GR7594 -1.481 
(-1.154) 
-2.483 
(-1.766) 
-1.451 
(-1.10) 
-1.148 
(-0.85) 
-0.821 
(-0.67) 
-0.296 
(-0.24) 
-0.6741 
(-0.512) 
-0.674 
(-0.512) 
-1.804 
(-1.43) 
-1.435 
(-1.15) 
-1.353 
(-0.65) 
-1.465 
(-1.57) 
LSEC75 -0.1667 
(-7.69) 
-0.1039 
(-3.96) 
-0.164 
(-7.23) 
-0.161 
(-7.62) 
-0.1425 
(-6.619) 
-0.149 
(-7.32) 
-0.1679 
(-7.848) 
-0.1679 
(-7.848) 
-0.1651 
(-7.16) 
-0.167 
(-7.28) 
-0.208 
(-5.30) 
-0.317 
(-4.41) 
POLITICAL 
FREEDOM 
-0.054 
(-2.27) 
-2.1E-4 
(-3.159) 
-0.012 
(-3.12) 
-0.025 
(-2.41) 
-0.79 
(-3.3) 
-0.909 
(-3.83) 
-0.030 
(-2.60) 
-0.103 
(-2.47) 
-0.007 
(-1.89) 
-0.025 
(-3.3) 
-0.002 
(-1.79) 
-0.002 
(-2.95) 
C 0.2131 
(3.276) 
0.2215 
(4.08) 
0.2053 
(3.344) 
0.2302 
(3.433) 
0.3869 
(4.611) 
0.3815 
(5.102) 
0.1880 
(3.276) 
-1.126 
(-5.63) 
0.1893 
(3.32) 
0.2117 
(3.423) 
0.153 
(1.474) 
0.144 
(1.585) 
             
OBS. 90 84 87 89 90 90 83 89 88 87 87 87 
METHOD 
OF  
EST. 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
ADJ. R2 0.578 0.482 0.464 0.529 0.582 0.458 0.4516 0.679 0.561 0.549 0.543 0.513 
International Business & Economics Research Journal  Volume 3, Number 10 
 46 
Appendix I: Measures of Political Instability 
 
 Anti-government Demonstrations: Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary 
purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding 
demonstrations of distinctly anti-foreign nature. 
 Assassinations: The average number of political assassinations per year per million populations. Major 
Cabinet Changes: The number of times in a year that a new premier is named and/or 50% of the cabinet 
posts are occupied by new ministers. 
 Communal and Political Victims: Dummy = 1 for a country with genocidal incidents involving communal 
(ethnic) victims or mixed communal and political victims. 
 Major Constitutional Changes: The number of basic alterations in a state’s constitutional structure, the 
extreme case being the adoption of a new constitution that significantly alters the prerogatives of the 
various branches of the government. 
 Coups:  The number of extra-constitutional or forced changes in the top government elite and/or its 
effective control of the nation’s power structure in a given year.  Unsuccessful coups are not counted.  
 Major Government Crises: Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the 
present regime- excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow.  
 Purges:  Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the 
regime or the opposition.   
 Revolutions: Any illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any 
successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government.    
 Riots: Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force.  
 War:  Dummy for war on national territory. 
 Civil War: Dummy for civil war. 
 
 
Appendix II:  Economic Policy Variables  
 
Fiscal Policy Variables: 
 
Debt:  Public and publicly guaranteed debt (current US dollars).  
Deficit: Overall budget deficit including grants (% of GDP).  
Expenditure: Central government consumption (% of GDP). 
Taxes: Tax revenue (% of GDP). 
 
Monetary Policy Variables: 
 
Domestic Credit: Net domestic credit (local currency unit). 
Exchange Rate: Real effective exchange rate index (1990 = 100).  
Inflation: GDP deflator (Annual %). 
Interest Rate: Deposit interest rate (%). 
Money:  Money and quasi-money (M2) as percent of GDP. 
 
Trade Policy Variables: 
 
Exports: Export of goods and services (% of GDP). 
Imports:  Import of goods and services (% of GDP). 
Trade: The value of imports plus exports (% of GDP). 
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